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Optimal Dynamic Management of
Agricultural Land-Uses: An Application
of Regime Switching
Graeme J. Doole and Greg L. Hertzler
The capacity of global agricultural production to meet increased demand for food from
population growth and wealth accumulation is threatened by extensive land degradation.
Nonetheless, previous research has focused primarily on the dynamic implications of input
management and ignored land-use choice. This paper extends this theory through an ex-
amination of the intertemporal management of agricultural land through the use of non-crop
inputs, such as fertilizer, and land uses that either degrade or restore productivity. The need to
consider the relative total asset value of alternative crops over time is demonstrated. More-
over, higher output prices for degrading crops are shown to increase their relative value,
motivating the later adoption of substitutes. An inability of land markets to reflect differences
in resource quality and low capital malleability promote greater degradation. However,
substitution of complementary effects through input use may help to sustain productivity.
These factors are discussed in the context of crop sequence management in Western Aus-
tralian cropping systems.
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Global agricultural production must increase
by around 40 per cent over the next 20 years
if increased demand due to population growth
and wealth accumulation is to be satisfied
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development and the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the UN (OECD-FAO), 2009).
However, this is seriously constrained by exten-
sive land degradation, particularly in develop-
ing countries, that directly decreases primary
productivity (Bruinsma, 2009). An improved un-
derstanding of the efficient management of land-
use sequences can help to offset these constraints,
a sr o t a t i o nw i t hc r o p sa n dp a s t u r e st h a th a v ea
beneficial impact on the inherent productivity of
a soil has been used for centuries to sustain or in-
crease the yields of agricultural plants (Doole and
Pannell, 2009).
The beneficialimpactsofland-use sequences
can be classified as either direct or indirect.
Direct benefits are the lowering of risk and the
smoothingofinputdemand.Indirectbenefitsare
those that influence profit by increasing the pro-
duction of subsequent crops (Hennessy, 2006).
Examples are the interruption of pest and disease
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 2011 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationcycles, the reduction of soil erosion, nitrogen
fixation by legumes, enhanced soil structure,
management of crop residues, and weed man-
agement (Doole and Pannell, 2009). Aggrega-
tion of indirect benefits provides an indication
of the productivity of the land resource; this is
analogous to a form of capital stock that partly
determines crop production.
McConnell (1983) formalized the relationship
between capital theory and the base productivity
of agricultural land. In this model, conservation
reduced current production and degradation could
not be offset through the addition of non-soil in-
puts, such as fertilizer (Barrett, 1991; McConnell,
1983). Barbier (1990) extended this framework
to incorporate ‘‘productive’’ and ‘‘ameliorative’’
inputs. The first increased both output and soil
loss, for example deep cultivation. The second
decreased erosion but did not affect crop pro-
duction directly, for example the construction of
terraces. Determining the optimal usage of the
former is similar to renewable resource exploi-
tation, while the latter resembles traditional in-
vestment theory (Clarke, 1992; LaFrance, 1992).
Links to capital theory are even stronger when
ameliorative practices enter as stock variables
and investment therefore has a lasting impact on
conservation (Grepperud, 1997).
The single crop approach adopted in these
papers disregards complementary effects between
agricultural practices. However, these can often
be important in reality (Orazem and Miranowski,
1994). Indirect effects may be incorporated by
identifying the optimal allocation of a given area
of land among crop and non-crop land uses, such
as pasture, at each point in time (Goetz, 1997).
However, aggregation of the impacts of land use
on productivity across an entire farm provides
a coarse approximation of their value. A more
precise examination requires analysisat the field
level, particularly since spatial heterogeneity in
land quality is a characteristic of many agricultural
systems. In this case, it is appropriate to analyze
crops as discrete choices rather than proportions.
Conceptual analyses of the optimal rotation
between land uses that degrade or restore land
quality have been formulated. Hertzler (1990)
analyzed a multiple crop system through the in-
clusion of time as a state variable. However, non-
crop inputs and costs incurred at the transition
between individual crops (switching costs) were
not incorporated, and both are shown here to
be an important component of the switching
decision. Willassen (2004), in comparison, in-
cluded switching costs in an analysis of the fal-
low-cultivation cycle of traditional agriculture.
Nonetheless, non-crop inputs, such as fertilizer
or herbicide, were omitted. This paper extends
this literature through the inclusion of both
multiple land uses and non-crop inputs in a
model incorporating transition costs. Key find-
i n g sa r ed i s c u s s e di nr e l a t i o nt os i n g l ec r o p
models and the management of crop sequences
in Western Australian agricultural systems.
The switching problem and necessary con-
ditions for an optimal solution are presented
in the next section. The model is based on the
general framework of Doole (2009). Implica-
tions for optimal land management under sin-
gle and multiple crops are outlined in the third
and fourth sections, respectively. Conclusions
are presented in the final section.
A Regime Switching Model of Agricultural
Land Management
This section contains a description of an opti-
mal switching model for the analysis of mul-
tiple crops and presents necessary conditions
for its solution. Assume that a producer must
determine the most profitable use of a field be-
tween t0and t2. Agiven enterprise, I51, is active
at the outset. However, the farmer may decide to
switch to a successive regime, I 5 2, at any time,
t1, between these endpoints. The moment before
the switch occurs is denoted t 
1 and the moment
after the switch has occurred is t1
1 .R e g i m e




where t0 £ t1 £ t2. The frame-
work could incorporate n switches but only one
is incorporated here for clarity of exposition.
Although an abstraction, the number of switch-
ing moments must be determined ex ante since
the endogenous determination of total switching
moments in multiple-phase control problems in-
corporating switching costs has proven intractable.
It is assumed that the quality of a fixed area
of land in terms of agricultural production may
be described by a composite index denoted by
a single state variable, x(t). Investment in land
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dex, while disinvestment causes a decline.
Productivity may be manipulated through
the intensity of management inputs, the control
variable denoted as ui(t). Controls are defined
as continuous functions for generality but in
mostcontexts are likely to be discrete practices.
Subscription by regime index permits the set of
management inputs (Ui, where ui(t) 2 Ui)t o
differ for each land use. For example, a herbi-
cide may control weeds effectively in crop 1
but harm crop 2 significantly. In this case, U1
may contain this herbicide but U2 would not.
Productivity is also influenced through crop
choice. Rates of degradation and renewal for
each land use i are described through motion
functions, fi(x(t),ui(t)). The units of measure-
ment for the motion functions will depend on
the definition of the state variable. A regime
may be either degrading (fdeg ( ) < 0) or re-
storing (fres ( ) > 0) of land quality. Examples
are wheat crops that degrade soil structure and
pasture legumes that restore soil nitrogen and
organic matter. The case where land is not af-
fected through crop choice is ignored to focus
on situations of practical relevance.
It is assumed that the use of an input has a
n e ti n c r e a s i n gi m p a c to nc r o py i e l d .A p p l i c a t i o n
increases base productivity, therefore [ fi ( )]u >0 ,
where [ ]u denotes the derivative of the function
in square brackets with respect to (w.r.t) the sub-
scripted term. An increase in productivity fol-
lowing input use will augment crop yield, yi(x(t)),
through the intuitive assumption, [yi ( )]x >0 .A n
example is nitrogen fertilizer that increases crop
yield through increasing soil nitrogen. Other
types of input may be more applicable to certain
problems. For example, ‘‘productive’’ inputs may
be used to investigate the management of sys-
tems where practices, such as deep cultivation,
increase output but degrade base productivity.
These may be easily incorporated in this frame-
work with adjustment of the relevant relation-
ships. The critical difference between productive
inputs and those analyzed in this paper is that
the latter allow intensification to occur with-
out degradation.
A statevector could represent baseproductivity
in place ofa composite index.Thisvector would
contain a number of individual determinants of
production, each with its own motion equation
and associated control set. For example, state-
transition equations representing a weed pop-
ulation and total soil nitrogen could be included.
The control set for the former could incorporate
different intensities of herbicide, while that for
the latter could involve alternative levels of ni-
trogen fertilizer. The use of a composite index
is retained for broader relevance and to avoid
problems associated with dimensionality.
The initial level of land quality is denoted
x(t0) 5 x0. The state trajectory is determined
by:
(1) _ xðtÞ 5 f iðxðtÞ,uiðtÞÞ,
for I 5 {1,2}. This is continuous but non-
differentiable at the switching time, t1.
A continuous profit function pi(x(t),ui(t),t)








e dt piyiðxðtÞÞ   ciðxðtÞ,uiðtÞÞ ðÞ dt,
where e
2dt is a discount factor with d as the
discount rate, pi is the price per unit of output,
yi(x(t)) is output, and ci(x(t)), ui(t)) is the cost of
inputs. As defined earlier, [yi ( )]x > 0. Costs are
assumed to increase as land quality declines
due to decreases in the effectiveness of inputs.
For example, more expensive cultural treatments
are required when a herbicide-resistant weed
population develops (Doole and Weetman, 2009).
Therefore, [ci ( )]x < 0. However, this assumption
may be relaxed with little effect on the follow-
ing discussion. In addition, inputs are costly, so
[ci ( )]u >0 .
Land has a salvage value defined through
the function e dt 
2 hðxðt 
2 ÞÞ. This is assumed to
increase with the productivity of land, so
½e dt 
2 hðxðt 
2 ÞÞ x > 0. Moving from one land use
to another incurs a switching cost, e dt 
1 sðxðt 
1 ÞÞ.
This increases with declining land quality,
therefore ½e dt 
1 sðxðt 
1 ÞÞ x <0 .A ne x a m p l ei s
pasture establishment for which costs increase
asweedpopulationsburgeon(Doole,2009).The
latter assumption may not be relevant for certain
problems, in which case it may be disregarded
with little implication for the main argument.






















(4) _ xðtÞ5f iðxðtÞ,uiðtÞÞ, and,
(5) xðt0Þ5x0.
This problem incorporates two standard free-
time optimal control problems with terminal
value functions. Solution is complicated be-
cause the management of the first regime in-
fluences the second through the state variable
and the optimal switching time must be endog-
enously determined. Necessary conditions for
the solution of a similar model have been derived
(Amit, 1986). However, that formulation does
not include a terminal value function. Solution
therefore requires Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Doole, 2009). Let (x*(t),ui*(t),
ti*) for I 5 {1,2} denote the trajectory that
maximizes J in Equation (3) subject to the
constraints in Equation (4) and Equation (5).
This is the optimal trajectory. A Hamiltonian




Under the optimal trajectory there exists a vec-
tor of piecewise continuous adjoint functions,
l 5 [l1(t),l2(t)], that each satisfies, over the









The optimal control function within each land





































The Hamiltonian functions for each regime, at
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2
      ,
for t 
0 <t 
1 5 t 
2 .
Conditions in Equation (6) to Equation (10) are
consistent with the solution of a standard free-
time optimal control problem with a salvage
value. Equations (11)–(14) are not. These collec-
tively specify the relationships that must hold at
the switching time. Equation (11) states that it is
optimal to switch from one agricultural practice
to another when the marginal value of renewal or
degradation matches that within the next regime.
(The level of base productivity at which this oc-
curs in this paper is referred to as the ‘‘switching
state’’ throughout.) Similarly, Equation (12) out-
lines that it is beneficial to switch to the successive
regime when it is more profitable to do so and
incur switching costs than remain in the active
land use. The expression in Equation (13) states
that the first regime should never be active if its
dynamic value is dominated by the successive
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In a similar vein, Equation (14) describes that
the second enterprise should not be utilized if
its capital value never matches that within the
first regime.
Optimal Management of Individual Crops
This section examines the optimal management
of agricultural land within individual regimes.
This outlines the implications of salvage value
for effective stewardship and provides a foun-
dation for the discussion of switching dynamics
that follows.
The Hamiltonian function for each regime
i is:
(15)
HiðxðtÞ,uiðtÞ,liðtÞ,tÞ¼e dt piyiðxðtÞÞ ð
 ciðxðtÞ,uiðtÞÞÞ þ liðtÞf iðxðtÞ,uiðtÞÞ.
The Hamiltonian function (Hi( )) represents
the total capital value of regime i and consists
of two terms. The first is discounted profit. The
second is the user benefit or user cost associ-
ated with current management, li(t) fi( ). This
is the total gain or loss in future profit from
time t to the end of the regime following an
increase or decrease in base productivity. User
benefit/cost involves two terms. The shadow
price of renewal or degradation (li(t)) reflects
the value of a unit change in base productivity
at time t in terms of profit earned over the re-
mainder of the regime’s duration. The second
term is the unit change in land quality, as de-
fined by the motion function.
Together with the state Equation (4) and the
initial condition Equation (5), optimal trajec-




5   e dt½cðxðtÞ,uiðtÞÞ u
1liðtÞ½f iðxðtÞ,uiðtÞÞ u 5 0, and,
(17)
_ liðtÞ5  
@Hið Þ
@xðtÞ




  liðtÞ½f ið Þ x.
The first equation, Equation (16), identifies that
inputs will be used up to the point where their
marginal cost (c( )]u) is equal to their marginal
benefit (li(t)[fi( )]u). Marginal benefit consists
of the physical relationship between input
application and the rate of degradation/renewal
([fi( )]u) multiplied by the marginal value of this
change in base productivity (li(t)). This specifi-
cation contrasts that presented with the inclusion
of ‘‘productive’’ inputs that enter the production
function of crops directly (Barbier, 1990; Clarke,
1992; LaFrance, 1992). In that case, the marginal
benefit of input use is marginal value product
(pi[yi(x(t), ui(t))]u,w h e r e[ yi( )]u > 0), the value of
marginal output accruing to input application.
The second equation, Equation 17, identifies
that the rate of depreciation/appreciation of land
capital is the total of its marginal contribution to
direct profits and capital investment under opti-
mal management. Greater insight can be gained
through focusing on the dynamics of the second
regime. Integration of Equation (15) for this
land-use yields:
(18)
l2ðtÞ 5 e ds
ð t2
§




where a 5 (d 1 [f2( )]x)(t 2 §). Equation (18)
identifies that the shadow price of a change in
base productivity at time § (§ > t1) is the present
value of the marginal profit earned between the
present and the terminal time. Marginal profit
isdiscountedbyd. In addition, it is discounted or
compounded by the rate, [fi( )]x, at which deg-
radation or renewal change with land quality.
The rate of degradation under a given crop
may increase as land quality declines. For in-
stance, soil loss accelerates at increased depth
because low organic matter reduces the binding of
aggregates (Goetz, 1997). This implies [fi( )]x <0
and is analogous to a greater discount rate. More-
over, the rate of renewal is likely to decrease as
land quality improves because of diminishing
marginal returns. Counter-examples do exist. For
example, it is generally easier for crop or pasture
plants to compete with lower weed populations.
However, diminishing marginal returns to re-
n e w a la r el i k e l yt oe f f e c t i v e l yb o u n di m p r o v e -
ments in yield (and consequently profit) at some
threshold. Therefore, [fi( )]x <0i sam o r er e -
alistic assumption.
Degradation _ xðtÞ<0 ðÞ reduces profit in the sec-
ondregime through decreasing yield ([y2( )]x>0 ) ,
increasing input costs ([c2( )]x >0 ) ,a n d
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shadow price implies a decrease in the future
profitability of this regime. This reduces user
cost and thus encourages more intensive resource
use. The causes of such a reduction are apparent
from Equation (18). The discount rate represents
the opportunity cost of capital. Higher returns
elsewhere in the economy therefore motivate
degradation (McConnell, 1983). As noted earlier,
degradation rates may increase as land quality
declines. This will promote exploitation so that
discounting has a lesser effect on the profits ac-
cruing to degradation. Declines in marginal profit,
such as those brought about by lower prices, will
also decrease the shadow price.
If the terminal regime restores agricultural
productivity _ xðtÞ >0 ðÞ then l2(t)f2( )i ns t ea dr e p -
resents a user benefit. A lower shadow price
(l2(t)) will decrease the magnitude of user benefit
and therefore decrease the incentive to retain this
land use. In line with the results for a phase that
degrades the resource base, this also occurs with
a higher discount rate, a rate of renewal that de-
clines with increased productivity, and lower
marginal profit. However, there is greater in-
centive to retain such an enterprise if rates of
renewal are augmented with increasing land
quality, i.e., [fi( )]x >0 .
The producer will sell the land at the point
where continuing farming of the last regime is
unprofitable. Here the following relationship,
consistent with Equation (9), holds:
(19)
H2ð Þ t 
2





2 ÞÞ x _ xðtÞ 5 0.
The first term (the Hamiltonian function for the
second regime evaluated at t2) represents the
marginal value ofextendingthe lengthof the final
regime. The second and third terms are the rate at
which the discounted salvage value of the farm
changes with adjustment of the terminal time.
The sum of these three terms must be zero at the
optimal time of sale; otherwise it is profitable to
continue management.
Prolonging the planning horizon will have
twoeffectsontheresalevalueofthefarm.These
are reflected in the second and third terms in
Equation (19). First, salvage value will decrease
through discounting. Second, it will decrease
(increase) with retention of the last regime if
this regime degrades (restores) land quality.
However, the last factor declines in importance
with decreases in the degree to which land
markets reflect differences in productivity.
The price of agricultural land should reflect
its expected long-term profitability under per-
fect information (Just and Miranowski, 1993).
Optimal management consequently requires
explicit consideration of current actions on the
resale value of the farm (see Equation (18) and
Equation (19)). However, this may not occur if
there are information failures, notions of be-
quest are weak, or capital markets do not clear
(McConnell, 1983). Incentives for conservation
will be reduced if land markets do not properly
account for differences in productivity (Clarke,
1992; Goetz, 1997). Suboptimal levels of ex-
ploitation will consequently be utilized, the de-
gree of disinvestment in land capital depending
on the extent to which the salvage value term is
sensitive to degradation of the base resource. This
will be highest in the extreme case where h(x(t2))
is independent of land quality as producers will
have no incentive to conserve the land resource in
order to obtain a higher terminal value.
Optimal Management of Multiple Crops
This section focuses on the analysis of crop
sequences utilizing the framework described in
the second section. Determining the optimal rate
of exploitation or investment across the relevant
planning horizon is the sole consideration if a
single crop exists. However, intertemporal plan-
ning requires simultaneous consideration of the
relative (potential) profitability of the successive
regime if a planting alternative is available.
Standard Switching Behavior under
Degradation and Renewal
Suppose that the optimal switching time is
freely variable t 
i 1 < t 




is presently more profitable to remain in the first
enterprise, it will be optimal to switch to
the successive regime at some stage. Prior to
switching, the Left Hand Sides (LHSs) of the
switching conditions in Equation 11 and Equation
12 will be greater than the Right Hand Sides.
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variable under the active regime will modify
both its own marginal value and that of the next
regime. Adjustment will continue until the
switching conditions hold with equality, beyond
which it ismore profitable to switch than remain
in the first regime.
Detailed analysis is possible from manipu-
lation of system equations and boundary condi-
tions from Theorem 1. Current values are used
here in order to simplify discussion. The neces-
sary conditions for the first stage are:




5  ½ c1ðx,u1Þ u 1f1½ f 1ðx,u1Þ u 5 0,
(22)
_ f1ðtÞ 5 df 
@H1ð Þ
@x
5 f1ðd  ½f 1ðx,u1Þ xÞ
  p1½y1ðxÞ x 1½c1ðx,u1Þ x,
where Hi( ) 5 piyi(x) 2 ci(x, u) 1 uifi(x, ui) and
ui(t) is the current value costate where ui (t) 5
e
dtli(t). The switching conditions that hold
prior to the switching time, assuming that switch-




6¼ l2ð Þ, and




The first switching condition, stated in Equa-
tion (23), specifies that the rate at which opti-
mal profit changes with a change in the state
variable is not equivalent between stages out-
side of the switching time. The LHS of this
equation may approach the switching condition
(l1( )1 [e
2dts( )]x5 l2( )) fromabove (l1( )1
[e
2dt s( )]x > l2( ) in Equation (23)) or from be-
low (l1( )1 [e
2dt s( )]x< l2( ) in Equation (23)),
depending on the parameters and functional forms
in the problem.
The second switching condition, stated in
Equation (24), specifies that the value of the first
regime is greater than that of the second regime.
Otherwise, it is profitable to switch into the next
phase. Insights into optimal switching behavior
can be gained through manipulation of Equation
(24). Substitute the definition of the Hamiltonian
function into this function to obtain:
(25)
p1y1ðxÞ c1ðx,uÞ1f1 f 1ðx,uiÞ ½ sð Þ t
> p2y2ðxÞ c2ðx,uÞ1f2 f 2ðx,uiÞ.
The Hamiltonian function for each stage rep-
resents its marginal value at time t. The first
two terms on the LHS of Equation (25) (p1y1(x) 2
c1(x, u)) represent current profit: total revenue
minus total cost. The next term (u1f1(x,ui))
represents the change in future profit associated
with a change in the resource stock. The key term
here is u1, which represents the marginal value
of a change in the state variable (land quality) at
time t. The state variable may decrease or in-
crease through f1(x,ui), depending on whether a
land use degrades or restores base productivity
and how this is modified by input management.
The last term on the LHS of (Equation 25)
([s( )]t) represents how time impacts the switch-
ing cost.
The LHS of Equation (25) will decline over
time if this regime degrades the base resource
and input management does not counteract this
effect. This occurs since fdeg( ) < 0 in this case
and the marginal value of the first regime falls
through yield decreases and increasing costs.
Alternatively, the LHS of Equation (25) will
increase over time through fres( ) > 0 if the first
regime restores land quality or the degrading
impact of an enterprise is subsumed by the
positive impacts of input application (e.g., soil
infertility is overcome through use of fertilizer).
In contrast to the degrading case, increases in
productivity will increase yield and decrease
costs.
A hypothetical trajectory for dynamic profit
within a net degrading enterprise (i.e., one in
which input application does not offset inherent
degradation) is labelled H1 in Figure 1. This
trajectory is understood to be defined by all
terms on the LHS of Equation (20), including
those concerning switching costs. A rise in the
dynamic value of a regime through investment
in land quality is demonstrated for the second
enterprise (curve H2) in Figure 1.
Dynamic profit decreases along the curve
H1 in Figure 1. This is consistent, for example,
with declines in profit with continuous cereal
cropping because of decreases in soil organic
matter. Dynamic profit will continue to decrease
until the switching conditions in Equation (11)
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which point it is optimal to switch to the next
regime. The optimal switching time occurs at
point A at time t1 in Figure 1. In the specific case
illustrated here, it is optimal to switch given that
remaining in the first enterprisewill drive dynamic
profitability below that which can be earned
within the second enterprise. This is demon-
strated in that remaining on H1 past the point
of intersection (point A) leads to a position where
H2( )>H1( ) 2 @s( )/@t1.
The curve for the renewing enterprise (H2)
is concave in Figure 1 to reflect diminishing
marginal returns to renewal. It is optimal to re-
main within enterprises that renew land quality
across the entire planning horizon if there is only
one state variable representing base productivity.
For example, suppose that a producer has adopted
a regime that renews land quality. Its dynamic
profit could follow a path such as H1 in Figure 2.
It would be profitable to switch to another re-
newing enterprise (H2)a tt1 in Figure 2 if dy-
namic profit were higher within this regime.
However, it will never be profitable to switch to
a degradingenterprise, such as H29 at t19 inFigure
2, if production functions are continuous—see
later text for a discussion of the implications
of discontinuous production functions—because
a higher return is earned by not switching. This
is evident in that dynamic profit along the tra-
jectory H1 is always higher than that on H29 past
switching time t19. This is a graphical illustration
of the necessary condition defined in Equation 14
that describes that the successive regime should
never be adopted ifits value never matches that of
the active enterprise.
This discussion has two important impli-
cations. First, it reinforces the importance of
considering the relative profitability of the al-
ternative crop. Second, it highlights the critical
need to incorporate multidimensional relation-
ships between enterprise use and base produc-
tivity if realistic optimal switching schedules are
to be obtained. In reality, enterprises that renew
base productivity are also likely to degrade
one or more determinants of production. In this
case, it may be optimal to switch to a degrading
enterprise at some time. An example is where
continued grazing of a legume pasture leads to
soil compaction and eventually to declines in
productivity.
Impacts of a Change in Output Price
on Switching Time and State
Modification of optimal management following
a change in output price for the active regime
may be identified through taking the partial dif-
ferential of the necessary conditions from Equa-
tions (20)–(25) with respect to p1. UsingEquation






e a p1ð Þ½y1ð Þ x
 
 ½c1ð Þ x
 
dt,
where a 5 (d 1 [ f2( )]x)(t 2 §). Substitution
of this expression into Equation (21) and de-
riving the partial differential with respect to p1
yields:
Figure 1. Dynamics of regimevalue following
a price decrease for a degrading regime.
Figure2. Dynamicsofoptimalswitchingwhen
t h ea c t i v er e g i m er e n e w st h eq u a l i t yo fl a n d .




5Dp1½f 1ð Þ uedðt sÞ
ð t1
§
e a½y1ð Þ xdt.
The term Dp1 represents the change in output
price, whereas [f1( )]u is the (positive) relation-
ship between input application and land quality.
These benefitsofinputapplicationareexpressed
in farm profit through the relationship connect-
ing base productivity and crop yield ([y1( )]x)
between the time of application and the terminal
time.
The differential of the necessary condition
that determines the optimal switching time (Equa-





5 Dp1 y1ðxÞ1edðt sÞ
ð t1
§





where E( ) denotes the LHS of Equation (25).
The first term in the square brackets describes
a change in the value of yield at time t.T h e
second term in thesquarebrackets represents the
current value of changes in marginal product
occurring across the remainder of the horizon.
This expression is positive (negative) for a price
increase (decrease). Nevertheless, its relationship
with the optimal switching time is indeterminate,
depending on the characteristics of the subse-
quent regime.
Assume the first phase is a degradingregime,
it is followed by one that restores land quality,
and input application does not overcome the
degradation caused by the first crop. In this case,
dynamic profit declines over time with degra-
dationaccordingtothe trajectory H1 in Figure 3.
The optimal path of degradation and renewal
across the two enterprises is ABD.H o w e v e r ,
regime value is promoted through the price in-
crease according to Equation (28). Hence, the
Hamiltonian trajectory shifts from H1 to H19 and
the optimal path is ACD. This causes an increase
in profit and an increase in the switching time,
ceteris paribus. By similar reasoning, it can be
established that a price decrease for product from
the first regime should encourage switching to
occur sooner. Moreover, these relationships will
hold regardless of whether the following enter-
prise degrades or renews land quality.
Another instance is possible where the first
regime renews soil quality. In this situation, the
relationship between the optimal switching time
and the output price depends on the nature of the
successive enterprise. A price increase should
delay switching if profit increases at a greater rate
in the consecutive regime. (In contrast, switching
will not occur if profit increases at a slower rate in
the next stage, consistent with Equation (14).) For
example, a price increase for the active regime in
Figure 4 shifts the optimal switching time from t1
to t19 f o l l o w i n gas h i f ti nt r a j e c t o r yf r o mH1 to
H19. This occurs as the active enterprise is now
more profitable and switching earlier has a higher
opportunity cost. In line with above discussion,
a producer will only switch to a degrading en-
terprise from a renewing regime if the latter starts
to degrade land quality at some time. In this case,
Figure 3. Dynamics of regimevalue following
a price increase for a degrading regime.
Figure 4. The effect of a price change for the
active regime when the successive regime re-
news land quality at a greater rate.
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that within a degrading enterprise.
A number of previous studies highlight an
inverse relationship between the optimal length
of a degrading phase and a change in its output
price (e.g., Goetz, 1997; Willassen, 2004). This
result is dependent on problem structure and
the nature of functions incorporated. It occurs
since returns to degradation are higher follow-
ing a price change and restorative enterprisesare
required to offset this damage. The positive as-
sociation between output price and the length of
a degrading regime found here is in accordance
with the law of supply and typical agricultural
practice. For instance, the higher profitability
of cereal crops, relative to livestock enterprises,
motivated extended cropping phases in Western
Australia throughout the 1990s (Doole and
Weetman, 2009). Increasing the area of land plan-
ted to degrading crops following an increase in
output price is also consistent with recommen-
dations from applications of equilibrium whole-
farm optimization models, even those explicitly
including degradation and renewal (e.g., Bathgate,
Revell, and Kingwell, 2009; Doole et al., 2009).
The differential of the necessary condition
that determines the optimal switching state







e a½y1ð Þ x dt,
where F( ) denotes the LHS of Equation (23).
Equation (23) determines the optimal level of
the state variable at the switching time based
on the relative value of the costate variables. A
price increase (Dp1 > 0) promotes the value of
marginal product across the remainder of the
horizon. This increases the magnitude of u1 for
a given value of x.
This will have different implications on the
optimal switching state, depending on the rela-
tive shapes of the costate trajectories. The cur-
vature and orientation of the adjoint profiles will
depend on the functions and parameters present
within a problem. An adjoint trajectory (e.g., l1
in Figure 5a) is an increasing function of the
state variable because investment in soil quality
improves yield, decreases input costs, and re-
duces the need for inputs. However, the relative
slopes of these functions will typically differ
between stages, reflecting differences in mar-
ginal returns to investment in soil quality.
Two cases exist in the two-stage problem.
First, assume that marginal returns to land in-
vestment are steeper in the first phase than the
second (Figure 5a). An increase in output price for
the first stage promotes the value of land quality,
shifting the costate profile upwards from l1to l19.
The optimal switching state therefore decreases
from x1to x2,a sl19 > l2atx1denotingthatthere
is a marginal benefit accruing to reducing x in
the first stage following a price increase. Sec-
ond, alternatively, assume that marginal returns
to land investment are steeper in the second
phase than the first (Figure 5b). The condition
l19 > l2 again holds at x1; however, the optimal
switching state is higher after the price increase
due to the relative curvature of the costate
trajectories.
Many single-crop analyses identify an indeter-
minate relationship between price and land
Figure5. Changes inthe switchingstate followinga priceincreaseinthe first regime assumingno
switching cost function is defined. Costate trajectories are denoted l1 and l2 for stage 1 and 2,
respectively, with l19 indicating the adjoint trajectory for the first regime after the price increase.
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radationthroughmotivatinggreateruseofinputs
that improve yield and degrade or encourage
conservation through increasing the marginal
benefit of soil conservation (Clarke, 1992;
Grepperud, 1997; LaFrance, 1992). The optimal
response of management decisions to output
price in this paper depends on relative returns to
investment. A higher output price will promote
greater investment in the soil resource through
increasing the marginal benefit of input ap-
plication (see Equation (27)). Moreover, it is
worthwhile to invest in soil quality following
a price increase in the first stage if the rate at
which marginal returns to this investment change
(i.e., the slope of the adjoint profile) is higher in
the second stage.
Impacts of a Change in the Switching Cost
Switching costs impact optimal management
through the necessary conditions in Equation (11)
and Equation (12). Assume two stages exist, it is
not yet optimal to switch, and use current-value
terms for simplicity. This yields: f1(t) 1 [s(x)]x 6¼
f2(t)a n dH1  ½ sðxÞ x_ x >H2.
Improving land quality decreases transition
costs (thus [s(x)]x < 0). This is captured in the
second term of f1(t) 1 [s(x)]x 6¼ f2(t). The net
effect of transition costs on the switching state
depends on the relative shapes of the costate
profiles, as discussed in the previous section
with reference to the output price. Increasing or
including marginal transition costs increases
the switching state if the slope of l1 dominates
that of l2, as there are greater relative returns
accruing to investment in stage 1 (Figure 6a).
In contrast, increasing or including marginal
transition costs lowers the switching state if the
slope of l1 dominates that of l1, as there are
lower relative returns accruing to investment in
stage 1 (Figure 6b). Suppose nitrogen fertilizer
is applied in both phases and the switching cost
is dependent on soil nitrogen. Inclusion of the
switching cost function reduces one component
of the benefit offertilizer application in the first
phase. However, it may be optimal to invest
further in soil quality if greater returns accrue
to this activity in the first stage.
The temporal value of switching costs is cap-
tured in H1  ½ sðxÞ x_ x > H2 where _ x5f iðx,uiÞ.
The impact of increasing or including switching
Figure 6. Influence of marginal switching costs on the adjoint trajectories (a and b) and Ham-
iltonian trajectories (c and d) in a two-stage problem. Trajectories without switching costs are
denoted l1, l2, H1, and H2. Trajectories l19 and H19 are the adjoint and Hamiltonian profiles with
marginal switching costs.
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Increasing or including transition costs decreases
the optimal switching time if a degrading regime
is followed by a restorative stage (Figure 6c). This
occurs because degradation (fi <0 )i n c r e a s e s
switching costs through [s(x)]x <0.Incontrast,
increasing or including transition costs further
promotes the value of a restorative enterprise.
This shifts its Hamiltonian function upwards,
promoting a later switching time (Figure 6d).
Switching Behavior with Discontinuous
Production Functions
Production functions yi(x) may be discontinu-
ous in some cases. Here, yi 5 0f o rx <   x and
yi > 0 for x ³   x, where   x is a threshold value
indicating a certain level of soil quality required
for crop growth. One example is that a saline
water table should be maintained at least two
metres below the soil surface to maintain growth
of agricultural crops and pastures (Clarke et al.,
2002).
This has interesting implications for switch-
ing behavior. The costate trajectory for the sec-
ond stage is not defined for all levels of the state
variable, just for x ³   x.H o w e v e r ,i tm a yb e
shallower (Figure 7a) orsteeper (Figure 7b) than
theadjointtrajectory forthe firststage.Thus,the
impact of changes in the output price and switching
cost on the optimal switching state remains in-
determinate in the case of discontinuous pro-
duction functions.
Suppose a discontinuous production func-
tion is defined for a degrading phase. Point e in
Figure 7c denotes where it is profitable to begin
producing in the (degrading) second regime
that possesses the discontinuous yield function.
The threshold of soil quality where this occurs
may be defined ^ x, where ^ x ³   x. In contrast,
point f in Figure 7c indicates where production
finishes under degradation as x5  x. (Although,
converse to this illustrative example, it may
be profitable to terminate production at x >   x.)
Switching occurs at t1 as H1 2 [s(x)]t < H2 holds
over ½t1
1 ,t2 , observable in Figure 7c as place-
ment of the trajectory H2 above H1. Equation
(13) describes that H1 2 [s(x)]t < H2 typically
infers that t 
0 5t 
1 <t 
2 . However, its inter-
pretation is different with a discontinuous yi(x)
because H2 is not defined over ½t0,t 
1  .
Suppose a discontinuous production func-
tion is defined for a restorative phase. Point g in
Figure 7d denotes where it is profitable to begin
producing in the (restorative) second regime
that possesses the discontinuous yield function.
This may occur at any x ³   x. Regime value
increases from here to its termination at point h
Figure 7. Influence of a discontinuous production function for the second regime on the adjoint
trajectories (a and b) and Hamiltonian trajectories (c and d) in a two-stage problem. State   x is
a threshold value indicating a certain level of soil quality required for crop growth.
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Switching occurs at t1 as H1 2 [s(x)]t < H2
holds over ½t1
1 ,t2 .
Parameter perturbation will alter the opti-
mal switching time in many circumstances, as
the shape and location of both H1and H2in (H,t)
space will usually change in response. Suppose
that price increases in the second stage. This
decreases the threshold ^ x at which the degrading
phase becomes profitable; thus, less renewal is
required in the first phase. This manifests itself
as an extension of H2 to H29 in Figure 7c. More-
over, regime value across the phase is promoted
through the price increase, resulting in an up-
ward shift of H2toH29(Figure 7c). The net effect
of these changes is that profit increases in the
degrading phase and the switching time occurs
earlier when a discontinuous production function
is present.
Conclusions
Dual consideration of non-crop inputs and
complementary effects between land uses in
this analysis resolves a significant shortcoming
in the analysis of land degradation. This addi-
tion brings such models closer to representing
modern agricultural systems in which both non-
crop inputs and indirect effects play important
roles in maintaining farm profitability. A key re-
sult is that it is optimal to increase the use of a
degrading cropwith anincreaseinitsoutput price,
converse to the findings of several earlier studies.
A second lesson is that an inability of land mar-
kets to reflect differences in resource quality re-
duces incentives for greater conservation. A third
implication is that low capital malleability may
promote degradation through increasing the cost
of switching between alternative land uses. Over-
all, these factors identify an explicit need to con-
sider dynamic factors in models of agricultural
decision-making, particularlythose involving land
allocations among multiple land-uses.
[Received February 2010; Accepted August 2010.]
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